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[L. A. No. 19622. In Bank. June 25, 1946.] 
EDWIN RUE MONROE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT 
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al., Respondents. 
[1] Divorce-Separa.te Maintenance-Decree.-A separate mainte-
nance decree does not end the marriage, and therefore does 
Dot end the obligation to support which arises out of the 
marriage rela.tionship; 1t only regulates the extent of that 
support. 
[2] Id. - Separate Maintenance-Modification of Allowance.-A 
decree of separa.te maintenance can be modified on a showing 
of changed circumstances. This rule is applicable to the period 
for which support is granted as well as to the amount thereof. 
[2) See 1 Cal.Jur. 1037; 27 Am.Jur. 33. 
MeK. Dig. References: [11 Divorce and Separation, § 166; [2,3) 
Divorce and Separation, § 171; [4) DiYorce and Separation, § 169; 
[5) Prohibition, § 40. 
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[3] Id.-Separate Maintenance-Modi1lcation of Allowance.-The 
trial court has jlll'i~rliction to modify a separate maintenance 
decree by ~anting a wife additional support· after the decree 
has become final and the period hae: elapsed during which pay-
ments were to be made, even though the court did not reserve 
jurisdiction to do so at the time it rendered the decree. Such 
jurisdiction exists indepndently of any provision in the decree 
as long as the parties remain married. 
[4] lei. - Separate Maintenance-Duration of Allowance.-Since 
the trial court has power under certain circumstances to deny 
any maintenance to a wife, it may give her an allowance for 
a limited period only. 
[5] Prohibition - Separate Maintenance Proceedings.-A writ of 
prohibition will not lie to restrain a hearing on a wife's appli- I 
cation to modify a decree of separate maintenance where the 
trial court would have the power to modify such decree if 
there was a sufficient change in circumstances. 
PROCEEDING for writ of prohibition to restrain the i 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County and John Beardsley, 
Judge thereof, from modifying a judgment for separate main-
tenance. Writ denied. 
Reynolds & Painter and I.ouis Miller for Petitioner. 
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, Douglas De Coster, Deputy 
County Counsel, and Hahn, Ross & Goldstone for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-A decree 01 separate maintenance ordered 
petitioner to pay his wife, for 27 months, $250 per month for 
her support and $50 per month for the support of their child. 
The decree provided that at the end of that period the pay-
ments for the support of the child shoUld be increased to $100 
per month. The court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make 
further orders regarding the support of the child, but made 
no such reservation as to the support of the wife. Petitioner 
complied with the decree. After the expiration of the 27 
months petitioner's wife applied for a modification of the 
decree and a further allowance for her support, alleging that 
the circumstances upon which the decree was based had ma-
terially changed. Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to 
restrain respondent court from proceeding in the matter on 
the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to modify the decree. 
A writ of prohibition can issue in this case only if, despite 
changed circumstances, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to 
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grant petitioner's wife a further allowance for her support. 
Hence, the question is not what changes in circumstances 
would justify the court in modifying its decree, assuming that 
it has the power to do so, but whether it has that power, assum-
ing a sufficient change in circumstances. 
[1] The right to support arises out of the marriage rela-
tionship. (Civ. Code, § 155.) .A separate maintenance decree 
does not end the marriage, and therefore does not end the 
obligation to support; it only regulates the extent of that 
support. [2] It is settled that a decree of separate mainte-
nance can be modified upon a showing of changed circum-
stances. (Civ. Code, § 137; O'Toole v. O'Toole, 215 Cal. 441, 
443 [10 P.2d 461]; Smith v. Smith, 113 Cal. 268, 271 [45 
P. 332]; Booth v. Booth, 100 Ca1.App. 28. 32 [279 P. 458]; 
Pa1'ker v. Parker, 74 Cal..App. 646, 654 [241 P. 581], and cases 
cited in 42 C.J.S. § 626, n. 62.) This rule is applicable to the 
period for which support is granted as well as to the amount 
thereof. Just as it may become necessary to increase the 
amount of support for a period of special needs, 80 it may 
become necessary to grant support for a period not eovered 
by the original decree. 
[S] Petitioner contends that section 137 of the Civil Code, 
which authorizes the court to modify its orders in a separate 
maintenance action, should be given a construction comparable 
to that of section 139 with respect to alimony in the case of a 
divorce. He relies upon Long v. Long, 17 Cal.2d 409 [110 P.2d 
383], and Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Ca1.2d 95 [73 P.2d 607], 
which held that the court has no power to modify a decree 
of divorce by granting a wife support after the decree has 
become final and the period has elapsed during which pay-
ments were to be made, unless the court reserved the power 
to do 80. In Tolle v. Superior Court, supra, and Long v. Long, 
mpra, the parties were no longer husband and wife when the 
attempt was made to have the court modify its decree. In con-
trast, section 137 presupposes that the parties remain married. 
When it divorce has been granted and the marital relation 
has ceased to exist, the jurisdiction that the court had over 
matters of support is exhausted unless the court has reserved 
it in an authorized manner. In the present case, however, 
there was no need for the court to reserve jurisdiction at the 
time it rendered its decree, for its jurisdiction would continue 
&8 long as the marital relationship continued. The order that 
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gave a 27-month allowance to petitioner's wife did not give 
the court any jurisdiction over that allowance that it would 
not otherwise have had. Nor did it deprive the court of any 
jurisdiction that it otherwise would have had, for the court 
cannot divest itself of such jurisdiction while the parties re-
mail} married. So long as they are married, the court cannot 
refuse to consider whether the husband should be required to 
support his wife, for it not only has the power to grant an 
allowance to the wife for her support, but it may also have the 
duty to do so under certain circumstances. In Baumgarten 
v. Baumgarten, 107 N.J.Eq. 274 [151 A. 606], the wife was 
awarded $5,000 in a lump sum for her separate maintenance 
in a decree that went even farther than the one in the present 
case, since it expressly stated that payment of that sum would 
permanently discharge the husband's obligation. Two years 
later the court nevertheless held that upon a showing of 
changed circumstances the wife would be entitled to a further 
allowance for her support. "The court cannot divest itself 
of the authority and the duty to make such further orders 
touching the support and maintenance of the wife as may be 
just and equitable. The order of March 21, 1928, should be 
interpreted to mean that the payment of the gross sum of 
$5,000 should satisfy the claims of the complainant against the 
defendant for maintenance only until equity and justice re-
quire the payment of additional sums." (107 N.J.Eq. 274, 280.) 
[4] Since the court has power under certain circumstances 
to deny any maintenance to the wife, it may give her an allow-
ance for a limited period only. The court determined in the 
present case that given the circumstances in which the parties 
found themselves when the decree was rendered, petitioner's 
wife should be gh'en an allowance for 27 months only. When 
the decree was rendered, petitioner's wife apparently had no 
objection to losing her allowance at the end of the 27 months, 
for she did not appeal from the decree. She does not now 
contend, however, that the court should then have given her 
an allowance for a longer period. She merely contends that 
circumstances have so changed that the court should now give 
her anot11er allowance. In Binkow v. Binkow, 298 Mich. 609 
[299 N.W. 734], the trial court granted separate maintenance 
to the wife for a period of two years. After that period 
elapsed the wife sought a further allowance for her support. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan denied her such allowance 
on the ground that she had made no showing of changed cir-
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cumstances. [6] The court may similarly conclude in the 
present case that petitioner's wife is not entitled to the modi-
fication that she seeks_ Petitioner cannot preyent the court. 
however, from passing upon that question. 
Petitioner contends that Erken'brach v. Erken'brach, 96 N. Y. 
456, and Koehl v. Koehl, 92 Misc. 579 [156 N.Y.S_ 234], sup-
port his position. Those cases are distinguishable, however, for 
they are concerned only with a question of statutory con-
struction, and the statute involved, unlike section 137 of the 
Civil Code, did not allow the decree to be modified under an~\' 
circumstance.'!. Moreover, those cases involved decrees of lim-
ited divorce, whereas the present case is one of separate 
maintenance. It t'! not necessary to determine here in what 
respects an action for separate maintenance differs from ac-
tions for limited divorce. divorce from bed and board or 
judicial separation, as th.ey are variously known (see 3 Nel· 
son, Divorce and Annulment (2d ed., 1945) § 32.05) for, a~ 
it exist'! in California, it differs from them in one respe(·t 
that make.'! the New York cases inapplicable. A limited di, 
vorce places the relationship of the pa.rties beyond the reMh 
of either of them alone. They are still married in tIle sen<;e 
that neither may remarry. but they are no longer married ill 
the sense that either can give the other the choice of resnmiJl~~ 
the marital relation or being guilty of desertion. As bet.we(,11 
themselves the parties are in the same position as they art' 
after a decree of absolute divorce. The California law make~ 
no provision for such limited divorces. It was expressly so 
held in McMullin v. McJfullin, 123 Cal. 653 [56 P. 5541, and 
although Grant v. Grant, 68 Cal.App. 23 [228 P. 412], con· 
tains a dictum to the contrary, the question was definitel: 
settled in Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal.2d 762 [68 P.2d 3511. 
In that case the husband obtained a Nevada divorce some tell 
years after his wife had secured a decree' of separate mainte· 
-·-nancein this state .. The husband then moved to stop his pa~'­
ments under that decree. The wife countered with an attac}; 
"upon the divorce and the content.ion that the maintenance 
decree had established that not she but her husband was at 
fault. This court held that, although t.hat decree established 
she was the innocent party when it was rendered, her attack 
upon the divorce must fail, for the evidence disclosed that the 
husband may have made a suhsequent offer in good faith to 
ful1ill his marital obligations and that she may thereafter have 
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given him a cause of action for divorce. It is clear that had 
the decree that she secured been a decree of limited divorce, a 
subsequent offer to resume marital relations could have DO 
effect, at last not until it was .accepted. 
Petitioner's application for a writ of prohibition is denied 
and the alternative writ heretofore issued is discharged. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. This proceeding in prohibition 
tests the question whether a trial court has jurisdiction to enter 
in a separate maintenance action a decree which finally and 
conclusively adjusts the property rights of the spouses and is 
not subject to modification upon a showing of changed cir-
cumstances. 
Here the trial court entered a decree of separate mainte-
nance which contains no reservation of jurisdiction as to 
property rights or otherwise, and which purports to be a final 
decree and to fully and forever settle the reciprocal rights 
and obligations of the parties. It makes provision for support 
of a minor child; it awards to the wife as her sole and sep-
arate property the family home, with all furniture, furnish-
ings, and equipment therein; it awards to her the specific 
amount of $250 a month to be paid by the husband for twenty-
seven months commencing on a specified date, and certain in-
surance which is to be kept in force by the husband for her 
benefit and that of the child: it awards the husband, as his 
sole and separate property, a certain automobile, bank funds, 
tax bonds, and war savings bonds. 
Were such a decree entered in a divorce action, it would be 
final and the writ of prohibition would lie to restrain a hearing 
in modification proceedings (Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. , 
2d 95 [73 P.2d 607]). (See, also, Puckett v. Puckett, 21Ca1. _~ ________ _ 
2d 833 [136 P.2d 1J, and review of authority therein; Long 
v. Long, 17 Cal.2d 409 [110 P.2d 383J; McClure v. McClure, 
4 Cal.2d 356 [49 P.2d 584, 100 A.L.R. 1257J; Harlan v. Har-
lan, 154 Cal. 341 [98 P. 32J: White v. White, 130 Cal. 597 
[62 P. 1062, 80 Am.St.Rep. 150J; McKay v. McKay, 125 Cal. 
65 [57 P. 677J; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 124 Cal. 422 [54 P. 225J; 
Greer v. Greer, 31 Cal.App.2d 39 [87 P.2d 388];) The same 
would be true if the parties, under similar circumstances, 
had voluntarily entered into a property settlement agreement 
) 
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which was fair and equitable at the time it was made. (See 
13 Cal.Jur. §§ 45, 46, pp. 846-847.) The "utmost freedom of 
contract respecting property exists in California between 
husband and wife." (13 Cal.Jur. § 45, p. 847; Perkins v. Sun-
set Tel. &- Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 719 [103 P. 190]; Civ. Code, 
§§ 158. 159.) It is contended, however, that in the case of a 
separate maintenance decree, a different rule applies, and that 
such a decree is always subject to modification upon a showing 
of changed circumstances. Many general statements of this 
rule may be cited. (42 C.J.S. §§ 626, 627, pp. 270 et seq.; 27 
Am.Jur. § 428, p. 33; 3 Nelson on Divorce and Annulment 
(2d ed.) § 32.44, p. 414; 71 A;L.R. 724; 127 A.L.R. 741.) 
In California section 137 of the Civil Code provides that 
"The court, in granting the husband or wife permanent sup; 
port and maintenance of himself or herself, •.• • shall make 
the same disposition of the community property and of the 
homestead. if any, as would have been made if the marriage 
had been dis..o;olved. • . • The final judgment in such action 
may be enforced by the court or by such order or orders as in 
its discretion it may from time to time deem necessary, and 
such order or orders may be varied, altered or revoked at the 
discretion of the court." 
A similar section with respect to divorce (Civ. Code, § 139), 
provides that "Where a divorce. is granted for an offense of 
the husband, the court may compel him to . . • make such 
suitable allowance to the wife for her support, during her 
life or for a shorter period as the court may deem just, having 
regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively; and 
the court may from time to time modify its orders in these 
respects. " 
Since the latter section has been construed to permit the 
entry in a divorce actionofa finalJl.djudication of property 
right.o; (eases above cited), it WIOuld seem by analogY that sec· 
tion 137 should be subjected to a similar construction. No 
California case has been found which expressly holds other· 
wise, but there are a number of cases in which modificatiom; 
have been approved, and in them, as well as in the California 
text (1 Ca1.Jur. § 87, pp. 1037-1038), there are general state· 
ments to the effect that separate maintenance decrees may be 
modified upon a proper showing. In none of these cases is 
the question directly presented or is it expressly declared that 
the court lacks Jurisdiction to enter a final decree, which is not 
subject to modification, in a separate maintenance suit. 
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In O'Toole v. O'Toole, 215 Cal. 441 [10 P.2d 461], a monthly 
allowance was decreed "until the further order of court," and 
under this reservation of jurisdiction, proceedings were enter-
tained for the purpose of determining whether changed cir-
cumstances warranted a modification. Booth v. Booth. 100 
Cal.App. 28 [279 P. 4581. is an appeal from an original decree, 
as is Parker v. Parker, 74 Cal.App. 646 r241 P. 581]. In 
Smith v. Smith. 113 Cal. 268 r45 P. 3321. a modification was 
denied. 
One theory advanced in support of the position that the 
court i~ powerless to make a final adjudication in a separate 
maintenance suit is that responsibility for support of the wife 
rests upon the husband as long as the marital status endures 
and. as a matter of public policy, no termination of her allow-
ance ~hould be countenanced which might leave her indigent 
and dependent upon the state f01" support. This theory, how-
ever. ignores entirely the rights of husband and wife who have 
separated. to settle their property right~ and obligations by 
contract. Furthermore, so far as the possibility of a helpless 
'IpOllSe being thrown upon the state for support is concerned. 
there is little difference between termination of an allowance 
by finll] decree of separate maintenance and termination by 
final decree of divorce. In both case.~ the right to support 
arOSf ont of the marriage obligation (Civ. Code, § 155), and 
is enf01'C'ible to the full extent of that obligation as adjudicated 
b~' t.he court. 
In other words. the right to support is not measured by the 
continuance of t.he marital status. It is but an incident of that 
status and ma~' be settled or litigated independently of it. The 
\·j(>w that so long as the parties are married. the court is power-
Icss to finall~' adjudicate the right to support, gives rise to the 
correlati"e view that {)nce the marriage -has been severed by 
dh'Ol'ee. the right to' support cease.~ even though it may not 
hav(> heen lit.igated in the divorce proceeding. The evil and 
injustiee which result from adherence to this view under 
present "oeia! conditions are shown in the dissenting opinion of 
1\11'. .J ustiee Rchauer in the recent case of Crouch v. Crouch, 
ante. pp. 24-~, 262 [169 P.2d 897] in which I concurred. 
(See. also. eoncurring opinion in DeYoung v, DeYoung, 27 
Ca1.2d 521. 527 [165 P.2d 457] ,) The only logical conclu-
sions, in my opinion, is that t.he right to support, which is an 
incident to the marriage relation, may be litigated finally and 
conclusively either during the existence of the marriage or 
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after it has been severed; that tlections 137 and 139 of the 
Civil Code are analogous and should be similarly construed; 
that under such a construction, the decree here involved must 
be held to be final; and that writ of prohibition will lie. 
Schauer, J.t concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied July 
24, 1946. Carter, J.t and Schauer, J.t voted for a rehearing. 
